🗊Презентация Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods

Категория: Экономика и Финансы
Нажмите для полного просмотра!
Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №1Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №2Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №3Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №4Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №5Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №6Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №7Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №8Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №9Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №10Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №11Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №12Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №13Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №14Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №15Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №16Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №17Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №18Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №19Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №20Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №21Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №22Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №23Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №24Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №25Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №26Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №27Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №28Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №29Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №30Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №31Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №32Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №33Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №34Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №35Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №36Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №37Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №38Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №39Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №40Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №41Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №42Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №43Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №44Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №45Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №46Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №47Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №48Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №49Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №50Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №51Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №52Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №53Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №54Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №55Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №56Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №57Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №58Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №59Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №60Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №61Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №62Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №63Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods, слайд №64
Скачать

Содержание ▲

Вы можете ознакомиться и скачать презентацию на тему Chapter Eighteen. Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods. Доклад-сообщение содержит 64 слайдов. Презентации для любого класса можно скачать бесплатно. Если материал и наш сайт презентаций Mypresentation Вам понравились – поделитесь им с друзьями с помощью социальных кнопок и добавьте в закладки в своем браузере.

Слайды и текст этой презентации

Слайд 1


Chapter Eighteen Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods
Описание слайда:
Chapter Eighteen Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods

Слайд 2


Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods In this chapter, we examine six main topics Externalities The inefficiency of competition with externalities Market structure and externalities Allocating property rights to reduce externalities Open-access common property Public goods
Описание слайда:
Externalities, Open Access, and Public Goods In this chapter, we examine six main topics Externalities The inefficiency of competition with externalities Market structure and externalities Allocating property rights to reduce externalities Open-access common property Public goods

Слайд 3


Externalities Externality The direct effect of the actions of a person or firm on another person’s well-being or a firm’s production capability rather than an indirect effect through changes in prices.
Описание слайда:
Externalities Externality The direct effect of the actions of a person or firm on another person’s well-being or a firm’s production capability rather than an indirect effect through changes in prices.

Слайд 4


Externalities Externalities may either help or harm others. An externality that harms someone is called a negative externality. A positive externality benefits others.
Описание слайда:
Externalities Externalities may either help or harm others. An externality that harms someone is called a negative externality. A positive externality benefits others.

Слайд 5


The inefficiency of competition with externalities Competitive firms and consumers do not have to pay for the harms of their negative externalities, so they create excessive amounts. Because producers are not compensated for the benefits of a positive externality, too little of such externalities is produced.
Описание слайда:
The inefficiency of competition with externalities Competitive firms and consumers do not have to pay for the harms of their negative externalities, so they create excessive amounts. Because producers are not compensated for the benefits of a positive externality, too little of such externalities is produced.

Слайд 6


The inefficiency of competition with externalities Private cost The cost of production only, not including externalities Social cost The private cost plus the cost of the harms from externalities
Описание слайда:
The inefficiency of competition with externalities Private cost The cost of production only, not including externalities Social cost The private cost plus the cost of the harms from externalities

Слайд 7


Supply-and-Demand Analysis We use a supply-and-demand diagram to illustrate that a competitive market produces excessive pollution because the firms’ private cost is less than their social cost.
Описание слайда:
Supply-and-Demand Analysis We use a supply-and-demand diagram to illustrate that a competitive market produces excessive pollution because the firms’ private cost is less than their social cost.

Слайд 8


Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market The competitive equilibrium, , is determined by the intersection of the demand curve and the competitive supply or private marginal cost curve, , which ignores the cost of pollution.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market The competitive equilibrium, , is determined by the intersection of the demand curve and the competitive supply or private marginal cost curve, , which ignores the cost of pollution.

Слайд 9


Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market The social optimum, , is at the intersection of the demand curve and the social marginal cost curve, , where is the marginal cost of the pollution (gunk). Private producer surplus is based on curve, and social producer surplus is based on the curve.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market The social optimum, , is at the intersection of the demand curve and the social marginal cost curve, , where is the marginal cost of the pollution (gunk). Private producer surplus is based on curve, and social producer surplus is based on the curve.

Слайд 10


Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.1 Welfare Effects of Pollution in a Competitive Market

Слайд 11


Supply-and-Demand Analysis The figure illustrates two main results with respect to negative externalities. First, a competitive market produces excessive negative externalities. Second, the optimal amount of pollution is greater than zero.
Описание слайда:
Supply-and-Demand Analysis The figure illustrates two main results with respect to negative externalities. First, a competitive market produces excessive negative externalities. Second, the optimal amount of pollution is greater than zero.

Слайд 12


Reducing Externalities Because competitive markets produce too many negative externalities, government intervention may provide a social gain.
Описание слайда:
Reducing Externalities Because competitive markets produce too many negative externalities, government intervention may provide a social gain.

Слайд 13


Table 18.1 Industrial CO2 Emissions, 2002
Описание слайда:
Table 18.1 Industrial CO2 Emissions, 2002

Слайд 14


Reducing Externalities If a government has sufficient knowledge about pollution damage, the demand curve, costs, and the production technology, it can force a competitive market to produce the social optimum.
Описание слайда:
Reducing Externalities If a government has sufficient knowledge about pollution damage, the demand curve, costs, and the production technology, it can force a competitive market to produce the social optimum.

Слайд 15


Reducing Externalities A governmental limit on the amount of air or water pollution that may be released is called an emission standard. A tax on air pollution is called an emissions fee, and a tax on discharges into the air or waterways is an effluent charge.
Описание слайда:
Reducing Externalities A governmental limit on the amount of air or water pollution that may be released is called an emission standard. A tax on air pollution is called an emissions fee, and a tax on discharges into the air or waterways is an effluent charge.

Слайд 16


Reducing Externalities Internalize the externality To bear the cost of the harm that one inflicts on others (or to capture the benefit that one provides to others)
Описание слайда:
Reducing Externalities Internalize the externality To bear the cost of the harm that one inflicts on others (or to capture the benefit that one provides to others)

Слайд 17


Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution Placing a tax on the firms equal to the harm the gunk, , causes them to internalize the externality, so their private marginal cost is the same as the social marginal cost, . As a result, the competitive after-tax equilibrium is the same as the social optimum, .
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution Placing a tax on the firms equal to the harm the gunk, , causes them to internalize the externality, so their private marginal cost is the same as the social marginal cost, . As a result, the competitive after-tax equilibrium is the same as the social optimum, .

Слайд 18


Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution Alternatively, applying a specific tax of per ton of paper, which is the marginal harm from the gunk at , also results in the social optimum.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution Alternatively, applying a specific tax of per ton of paper, which is the marginal harm from the gunk at , also results in the social optimum.

Слайд 19


Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.2 Taxes to Control Pollution

Слайд 20


Cost-Benefit Analysis By using a cost-benefit analysis, we obtain another interpretation of the pollution problem in terms of the marginal cost and benefit of the pollution itself.
Описание слайда:
Cost-Benefit Analysis By using a cost-benefit analysis, we obtain another interpretation of the pollution problem in terms of the marginal cost and benefit of the pollution itself.

Слайд 21


Cost-Benefit Analysis Welfare is maximized by reducing output and pollution until the marginal benefit from less pollution equals the marginal cost of less output.
Описание слайда:
Cost-Benefit Analysis Welfare is maximized by reducing output and pollution until the marginal benefit from less pollution equals the marginal cost of less output.

Слайд 22


Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution The benefit curve reflects the reduction in harm from pollution as the amount of gunk falls from the competitive level. The cost of reducing the amount of gunk is the fall in output, which reduces consumer surplus and private producer surplus. Welfare is maximized at 84 tons of paper and 84 units of gunk, the quantities at which the difference between the benefit and cost curves, the net benefit, is greatest.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution The benefit curve reflects the reduction in harm from pollution as the amount of gunk falls from the competitive level. The cost of reducing the amount of gunk is the fall in output, which reduces consumer surplus and private producer surplus. Welfare is maximized at 84 tons of paper and 84 units of gunk, the quantities at which the difference between the benefit and cost curves, the net benefit, is greatest.

Слайд 23


Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution The net benefit is maximized where the marginal benefit, , which is the slope of the benefit curve, equals the marginal cost, , the slope of the cost curve.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution The net benefit is maximized where the marginal benefit, , which is the slope of the benefit curve, equals the marginal cost, , the slope of the cost curve.

Слайд 24


Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis of Pollution

Слайд 25


Market Structure and Externalities Two of our main results concerning competitive markets and negative externalities—that too much pollution is produced and that a tax equal to the marginal social cost of the externality solves the problem—do not hold for other market structures.
Описание слайда:
Market Structure and Externalities Two of our main results concerning competitive markets and negative externalities—that too much pollution is produced and that a tax equal to the marginal social cost of the externality solves the problem—do not hold for other market structures.

Слайд 26


Monopoly and Externalities Although the competitive market with an externality always produces more output than the social optimum, a monopoly may produce more than, the same as, or less than the social optimum.
Описание слайда:
Monopoly and Externalities Although the competitive market with an externality always produces more output than the social optimum, a monopoly may produce more than, the same as, or less than the social optimum.

Слайд 27


Monopoly and Externalities Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity of demand for the output and on the extent of the marginal damage the pollution causes.
Описание слайда:
Monopoly and Externalities Which effect dominates depends on the elasticity of demand for the output and on the extent of the marginal damage the pollution causes.

Слайд 28


Monopoly Versus Competitive Welfare with Externalities In the absence of externalities, welfare is greater under competition than under an unregulated monopoly. However, with an externality, welfare may be greater with monopoly than with competition.
Описание слайда:
Monopoly Versus Competitive Welfare with Externalities In the absence of externalities, welfare is greater under competition than under an unregulated monopoly. However, with an externality, welfare may be greater with monopoly than with competition.

Слайд 29


Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution At the competitive equilibrium, , more is produced than at the social optimum, . As a result, the deadweight loss in the competitive market is . The monopoly equilibrium, , is determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue and the private marginal cost, , curves.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution At the competitive equilibrium, , more is produced than at the social optimum, . As a result, the deadweight loss in the competitive market is . The monopoly equilibrium, , is determined by the intersection of the marginal revenue and the private marginal cost, , curves.

Слайд 30


Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution The social welfare (based on the marginal social cost, , curve) under monopoly is . Here the deadweight loss of monopoly, , is less than the deadweight loss under competition, .
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution The social welfare (based on the marginal social cost, , curve) under monopoly is . Here the deadweight loss of monopoly, , is less than the deadweight loss under competition, .

Слайд 31


Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.4 Monopoly, Competition, and Social Optimum with Pollution

Слайд 32


Taxing Externalities in Noncompetitive Markets Trying to solve a negative externality problem is more complex in a noncompetitive market than in a competitive market.
Описание слайда:
Taxing Externalities in Noncompetitive Markets Trying to solve a negative externality problem is more complex in a noncompetitive market than in a competitive market.

Слайд 33


Taxing Externalities in Noncompetitive Markets To achieve a social optimum in a competitive market, the government only has to reduce the externality, possibly by decreasing output. In a noncompetitive market, the government must eliminate problems arising from both externalities and the exercise of market power.
Описание слайда:
Taxing Externalities in Noncompetitive Markets To achieve a social optimum in a competitive market, the government only has to reduce the externality, possibly by decreasing output. In a noncompetitive market, the government must eliminate problems arising from both externalities and the exercise of market power.

Слайд 34


Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities Instead of controlling externalities directly through emissions fees and emissions standards, the government may take an indirect approach by assigning a property right: an exclusive privilege to use an asset.
Описание слайда:
Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities Instead of controlling externalities directly through emissions fees and emissions standards, the government may take an indirect approach by assigning a property right: an exclusive privilege to use an asset.

Слайд 35


Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities If no one holds a property right for a good or a bad, the good or bad is unlikely to have a price.
Описание слайда:
Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities If no one holds a property right for a good or a bad, the good or bad is unlikely to have a price.

Слайд 36


Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities For many bads, such as pollution, and for some goods, property rights are not clearly defined. No one has exclusive property rights to the sir we breathe. Because of this lack of a price, a polluter’s private marginal cost of production is less than the full social marginal cost.
Описание слайда:
Allocating Property Rights to Reduce Externalities For many bads, such as pollution, and for some goods, property rights are not clearly defined. No one has exclusive property rights to the sir we breathe. Because of this lack of a price, a polluter’s private marginal cost of production is less than the full social marginal cost.

Слайд 37


Coase Theorem According to the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960), the optimal levels of pollution and output can result from bargaining between polluters and their victims if property rights are clearly defined.
Описание слайда:
Coase Theorem According to the Coase Theorem (Coase, 1960), the optimal levels of pollution and output can result from bargaining between polluters and their victims if property rights are clearly defined.

Слайд 38


Table 18.2 (a,b) Property Rights and Bargaining
Описание слайда:
Table 18.2 (a,b) Property Rights and Bargaining

Слайд 39


Table 18.2 (c) Property Rights and Bargaining
Описание слайда:
Table 18.2 (c) Property Rights and Bargaining

Слайд 40


Coase Theorem If there are no impediments to bargaining, assigning property rights results in the efficient outcome at which joint profits are maximized. Efficiency is achieved regardless of who receives the property rights.
Описание слайда:
Coase Theorem If there are no impediments to bargaining, assigning property rights results in the efficient outcome at which joint profits are maximized. Efficiency is achieved regardless of who receives the property rights.

Слайд 41


Coase Theorem Who gets the property rights affects the income distribution. The property rights are valuable. The party with the property rights may be compensated by the other party.
Описание слайда:
Coase Theorem Who gets the property rights affects the income distribution. The property rights are valuable. The party with the property rights may be compensated by the other party.

Слайд 42


Problems with the Coase Approach First, if transaction costs are very high, it might not pay for the two sides to meet. Second, if firms engage in strategic bargaining behavior, an agreement may not be reached. Third, if either side lacks information about the costs or benefits or reducing pollution, a nonefficient outcome may occur.
Описание слайда:
Problems with the Coase Approach First, if transaction costs are very high, it might not pay for the two sides to meet. Second, if firms engage in strategic bargaining behavior, an agreement may not be reached. Third, if either side lacks information about the costs or benefits or reducing pollution, a nonefficient outcome may occur.

Слайд 43


Markets for Pollution If high transaction costs preclude bargaining, we may be able to overcome this problem by using a market, which facilitates exchanges between individuals.
Описание слайда:
Markets for Pollution If high transaction costs preclude bargaining, we may be able to overcome this problem by using a market, which facilitates exchanges between individuals.

Слайд 44


Markets for Pollution Under this cap and trade system, the government gives firms permits, each of which confers the right to create a certain amount of pollution. Each firm may use its permits or sell them to other firms.
Описание слайда:
Markets for Pollution Under this cap and trade system, the government gives firms permits, each of which confers the right to create a certain amount of pollution. Each firm may use its permits or sell them to other firms.

Слайд 45


Markets for Pollution Bu using a market, the government does not have to collect this type of detailed information to achieve efficiency. Its only decision concerns what total amount of pollution to allow.
Описание слайда:
Markets for Pollution Bu using a market, the government does not have to collect this type of detailed information to achieve efficiency. Its only decision concerns what total amount of pollution to allow.

Слайд 46


Open-Access Common Property Open-Access Common Property Resources to which everyone has free access
Описание слайда:
Open-Access Common Property Open-Access Common Property Resources to which everyone has free access

Слайд 47


Overuse of Open-Access Common Property Because people do not have to pay to use open-access common property resources, they are overused. e.g.
Описание слайда:
Overuse of Open-Access Common Property Because people do not have to pay to use open-access common property resources, they are overused. e.g.

Слайд 48


Solving the Commons Problem Government Regulation of Commons Overuse of a common resource occurs because individuals do not bear the full social cost. However, by applying a tax or fee equal to the externality harm that each individual imposes on others, a government forces each person to internalize the externality.
Описание слайда:
Solving the Commons Problem Government Regulation of Commons Overuse of a common resource occurs because individuals do not bear the full social cost. However, by applying a tax or fee equal to the externality harm that each individual imposes on others, a government forces each person to internalize the externality.

Слайд 49


Solving the Commons Problem Government Regulation of Commons Alternatively, the government can restrict access to the commons. One typical approach is to grant access on a first-come, first-served basis.
Описание слайда:
Solving the Commons Problem Government Regulation of Commons Alternatively, the government can restrict access to the commons. One typical approach is to grant access on a first-come, first-served basis.

Слайд 50


Solving the Commons Problem Assigning Property Rights An alternative approach to resolving the commons problem is to assign private property rights.
Описание слайда:
Solving the Commons Problem Assigning Property Rights An alternative approach to resolving the commons problem is to assign private property rights.

Слайд 51


Public Goods Public Good A commodity or service whose consumption by one person does not preclude others from also consuming it
Описание слайда:
Public Goods Public Good A commodity or service whose consumption by one person does not preclude others from also consuming it

Слайд 52


Table 18.3 Rivalry and Exclusion
Описание слайда:
Table 18.3 Rivalry and Exclusion

Слайд 53


Markets for Public Goods Markets for public goods exist only if nonpurchasers can be excluded from consuming them. Markets do not exist for nonexclusive public goods. If the government does not provide a nonexclusive public good, no one provides it.
Описание слайда:
Markets for Public Goods Markets for public goods exist only if nonpurchasers can be excluded from consuming them. Markets do not exist for nonexclusive public goods. If the government does not provide a nonexclusive public good, no one provides it.

Слайд 54


Demand for Public Goods Because a public good lacks rivalry, many people can get pleasure from the same unit of output. As a consequence, the social demand curve or willingness-to-pay curve for a public good is the vertical sum of the demand curves of each individual.
Описание слайда:
Demand for Public Goods Because a public good lacks rivalry, many people can get pleasure from the same unit of output. As a consequence, the social demand curve or willingness-to-pay curve for a public good is the vertical sum of the demand curves of each individual.

Слайд 55


Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good Security guards protect both tenants of the mall. If each guard costs $10 per hour, the television store, with demand , is willing to hire four guards per hour. The ice-cream parlor, with demand , is not willing to hire any guards.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good Security guards protect both tenants of the mall. If each guard costs $10 per hour, the television store, with demand , is willing to hire four guards per hour. The ice-cream parlor, with demand , is not willing to hire any guards.

Слайд 56


Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good Thus if everyone acts independently, the equilibrium is . The social demand for this public good is the vertical sum of the individual demand curves, . Thus the social optimum is , at which five guards are hired.
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good Thus if everyone acts independently, the equilibrium is . The social demand for this public good is the vertical sum of the individual demand curves, . Thus the social optimum is , at which five guards are hired.

Слайд 57


Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good
Описание слайда:
Figure 18.5 Inadequate Provision of a Public Good

Слайд 58


Free Riding Many people are unwilling to pay for their share of a public good. They try to get others to pay for it, so they can free ride: benefit from the actions of others without paying.
Описание слайда:
Free Riding Many people are unwilling to pay for their share of a public good. They try to get others to pay for it, so they can free ride: benefit from the actions of others without paying.

Слайд 59


Table 18.4 Private Payments for a Public Good
Описание слайда:
Table 18.4 Private Payments for a Public Good

Слайд 60


Free Riding In each of these games, the Nash equilibrium is for neither store to hire a guard because of free riding. The nonoptimal outcome occurs for the same reason as in other prisoners’ dilemma games: The stores don’t do what is best for them collectively when they act independently.
Описание слайда:
Free Riding In each of these games, the Nash equilibrium is for neither store to hire a guard because of free riding. The nonoptimal outcome occurs for the same reason as in other prisoners’ dilemma games: The stores don’t do what is best for them collectively when they act independently.

Слайд 61


Reducing Free Riding Governmental or other collective actions can reduce free riding. Methods that may be used include social pressure, merges, compulsion, and privatization.
Описание слайда:
Reducing Free Riding Governmental or other collective actions can reduce free riding. Methods that may be used include social pressure, merges, compulsion, and privatization.

Слайд 62


Valuing Public Goods To ensure that a nonexclusive public good is provided, a government usually produces it or compels others to do so. Issues that a government faces in providing such a public good include whether to provide it at all and, if so, how much to provide.
Описание слайда:
Valuing Public Goods To ensure that a nonexclusive public good is provided, a government usually produces it or compels others to do so. Issues that a government faces in providing such a public good include whether to provide it at all and, if so, how much to provide.

Слайд 63


Table 18.5 Voting on $300 Traffic Signals
Описание слайда:
Table 18.5 Voting on $300 Traffic Signals

Слайд 64


Valuing Public Goods The problem with yes-no votes is that they ignore the intensity of preferences. Thus such majority voting fails to value the public good fully and hence does not guarantee that it is efficiently provided.
Описание слайда:
Valuing Public Goods The problem with yes-no votes is that they ignore the intensity of preferences. Thus such majority voting fails to value the public good fully and hence does not guarantee that it is efficiently provided.

Скачать

Похожие презентации
Mypresentation.ru
Загрузить презентацию