🗊Презентация Monopoly Behavior

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Слайды и текст этой презентации


Слайд 1






Monopoly Behavior
Описание слайда:
Monopoly Behavior

Слайд 2





A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for a tooth extraction :
A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for a tooth extraction :
— "85 pounds for an extraction, sir" the dentist replied. 
** "85 quid ! Huv ye no'got anythin' cheaper ?„
— "That's the normal charge,” said the dentist. 
** "Whit about if ye didn’t use any anesthetic ?„
— "That's unusual, sir, but I could do it and it would knock 15 pounds off". 
** "What aboot if ye used one of your dentist trainees and still without any anesthetic ?"
Описание слайда:
A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for a tooth extraction : A Scotsman phones a dentist to inquire about the cost for a tooth extraction : — "85 pounds for an extraction, sir" the dentist replied. ** "85 quid ! Huv ye no'got anythin' cheaper ?„ — "That's the normal charge,” said the dentist. ** "Whit about if ye didn’t use any anesthetic ?„ — "That's unusual, sir, but I could do it and it would knock 15 pounds off". ** "What aboot if ye used one of your dentist trainees and still without any anesthetic ?"

Слайд 3





— "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But the price could drop by 20 pounds.”
— "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But the price could drop by 20 pounds.”
** "How aboot if ye make it a trainin' session, have yer student do the extraction with the other students watchin' and learning‚?„
— "It'll be good for the students", mulled the dentist. "I'll charge you 5 pounds but it will be traumatic". 
** " It's a deal,” said the Scotsman. "Can ye confirm an appointment for my wife next Tuesday then ?"
Описание слайда:
— "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But the price could drop by 20 pounds.” — "I can't guarantee their professionalism and it'll be painful. But the price could drop by 20 pounds.” ** "How aboot if ye make it a trainin' session, have yer student do the extraction with the other students watchin' and learning‚?„ — "It'll be good for the students", mulled the dentist. "I'll charge you 5 pounds but it will be traumatic". ** " It's a deal,” said the Scotsman. "Can ye confirm an appointment for my wife next Tuesday then ?"

Слайд 4





How Should a Monopoly Price?
So far a monopoly has been thought of as a firm which has to sell its product at the same price to every customer.  This is uniform pricing.
Can price-discrimination earn a monopoly higher profits?
Описание слайда:
How Should a Monopoly Price? So far a monopoly has been thought of as a firm which has to sell its product at the same price to every customer. This is uniform pricing. Can price-discrimination earn a monopoly higher profits?

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
All pricing strategies we will examine are means of capturing consumer surplus and transferring it to the producer
Profit maximizing point of P* and Q*
But some consumers will pay more than P* for a good
Raising price will lose some consumers, leading to smaller profits
Lowering price will gain some consumers, but lower profits
Описание слайда:
Capturing Consumer Surplus All pricing strategies we will examine are means of capturing consumer surplus and transferring it to the producer Profit maximizing point of P* and Q* But some consumers will pay more than P* for a good Raising price will lose some consumers, leading to smaller profits Lowering price will gain some consumers, but lower profits

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
Описание слайда:
Capturing Consumer Surplus

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Capturing Consumer Surplus
Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices to different consumers for similar goods
Must be able to identify the different consumers and get them to pay different prices
Other techniques that expand the range of a firm’s market to get at more consumer surplus
Tariffs and bundling
Описание слайда:
Capturing Consumer Surplus Price discrimination is the practice of charging different prices to different consumers for similar goods Must be able to identify the different consumers and get them to pay different prices Other techniques that expand the range of a firm’s market to get at more consumer surplus Tariffs and bundling

Слайд 8





Price discrimination
Price discrimination requires the absence of resale
Описание слайда:
Price discrimination Price discrimination requires the absence of resale

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Types of Price Discrimination
1st-degree:  Each output unit is sold at a different price.  Prices may differ across buyers.
2nd-degree:  The price paid by a buyer can vary with the quantity demanded by the buyer.  But all customers face the same price schedule.  E.g., bulk-buying discounts.
Описание слайда:
Types of Price Discrimination 1st-degree: Each output unit is sold at a different price. Prices may differ across buyers. 2nd-degree: The price paid by a buyer can vary with the quantity demanded by the buyer. But all customers face the same price schedule. E.g., bulk-buying discounts.

Слайд 10





Types of Price Discrimination
3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased.  But price may differ across buyer groups.
E.g., senior citizen  and student discounts vs. no discounts  for middle-aged persons.
Описание слайда:
Types of Price Discrimination 3rd-degree: Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups. E.g., senior citizen and student discounts vs. no discounts for middle-aged persons.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Each output unit is sold at a different price.  Price may differ across buyers.
It requires that the monopolist can discover the buyer with the highest valuation of its product, the buyer with the next highest valuation, and so on.
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination Each output unit is sold at a different price. Price may differ across buyers. It requires that the monopolist can discover the buyer with the highest valuation of its product, the buyer with the next highest valuation, and so on.

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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First-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination

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Fig. 25.2
Описание слайда:
Fig. 25.2

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First-degree Price Discrimination
First-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the possible gains-to-trade, leaves the buyers with zero surplus, and supplies the efficient amount of output.
Описание слайда:
First-degree Price Discrimination First-degree price discrimination gives a monopolist all of the possible gains-to-trade, leaves the buyers with zero surplus, and supplies the efficient amount of output.

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First-Degree Price Discrimination
In practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possible
Impractical to charge every customer a different price (unless very few customers)
Firms usually do not know reservation price of each customer
Firms can discriminate imperfectly
Can charge a few different prices based on some estimates of reservation prices
Описание слайда:
First-Degree Price Discrimination In practice, perfect price discrimination is almost never possible Impractical to charge every customer a different price (unless very few customers) Firms usually do not know reservation price of each customer Firms can discriminate imperfectly Can charge a few different prices based on some estimates of reservation prices

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First-Degree Price Discrimination
Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has the ability to segregate the market to some extent and charge different prices for the same product:
Lawyers, doctors, accountants, priests, policemen
Car salesperson (15% profit margin)
Colleges and universities (differences in financial aid)
Описание слайда:
First-Degree Price Discrimination Examples of imperfect price discrimination where the seller has the ability to segregate the market to some extent and charge different prices for the same product: Lawyers, doctors, accountants, priests, policemen Car salesperson (15% profit margin) Colleges and universities (differences in financial aid)

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
In some markets, consumers purchase many units of a good over time
Demand for that good declines with increased consumption
Electricity, water, heating fuel
Firms can engage in second-degree price discrimination
Practice of charging different prices per unit for different quantities of the same good or service
Описание слайда:
Second-Degree Price Discrimination In some markets, consumers purchase many units of a good over time Demand for that good declines with increased consumption Electricity, water, heating fuel Firms can engage in second-degree price discrimination Practice of charging different prices per unit for different quantities of the same good or service

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Quantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discrimination
Ex: Buying in bulk at Sam’s Club
Block pricing – the practice of charging different prices for different quantities of “blocks” of a good
Ex: electric power companies charge different prices for a consumer purchasing a set block of electricity
Описание слайда:
Second-Degree Price Discrimination Quantity discounts are an example of second-degree price discrimination Ex: Buying in bulk at Sam’s Club Block pricing – the practice of charging different prices for different quantities of “blocks” of a good Ex: electric power companies charge different prices for a consumer purchasing a set block of electricity

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Second-Degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Second-Degree Price Discrimination

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Fig. 25.3
Описание слайда:
Fig. 25.3

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Fig. 25.3
Описание слайда:
Fig. 25.3

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Fig. 25.3
Описание слайда:
Fig. 25.3

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Fig. 25.3
Описание слайда:
Fig. 25.3

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased.  But price may differ across buyer groups.
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination Price paid by buyers in a given group is the same for all units purchased. But price may differ across buyer groups.

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity of product supplied to that market.
So the question “What discriminatory prices will the monopolist set, one for each group?” is really the question “How many units of product will the monopolist supply to each group?”
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination A monopolist manipulates market price by altering the quantity of product supplied to that market. So the question “What discriminatory prices will the monopolist set, one for each group?” is really the question “How many units of product will the monopolist supply to each group?”

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Описание слайда:
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Описание слайда:
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

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PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Описание слайда:
PRICE DISCRIMINATION

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price?
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price?

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price?
Recall that
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price? Recall that

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price?
Recall that




But,
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination In which market will the monopolist cause the higher price? Recall that But,

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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Third-degree Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Third-degree Price Discrimination

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No Sales to Smaller Market
Even if third-degree price discrimination is possible, it may not be feasible to try to sell to both groups
It is possible that the demand for one group is so low that it would not be profitable to lower price enough to sell to that group
Описание слайда:
No Sales to Smaller Market Even if third-degree price discrimination is possible, it may not be feasible to try to sell to both groups It is possible that the demand for one group is so low that it would not be profitable to lower price enough to sell to that group

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No Sales to Smaller Market
Описание слайда:
No Sales to Smaller Market

Слайд 45





The Economics of Coupons 
and Rebates
Those consumers who are more price elastic will tend to use the coupon/rebate more often when they purchase the product than those consumers with a less elastic demand
Coupons and rebate programs allow firms to price discriminate
Описание слайда:
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates Those consumers who are more price elastic will tend to use the coupon/rebate more often when they purchase the product than those consumers with a less elastic demand Coupons and rebate programs allow firms to price discriminate

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The Economics of Coupons 
and Rebates
About 20 – 30% of consumers use coupons or rebates
Firms can get those with higher elasticities of demand to purchase the good who would not normally buy it
Table 11.1 shows how elasticities of demand vary for coupon/rebate users and non-users
Описание слайда:
The Economics of Coupons and Rebates About 20 – 30% of consumers use coupons or rebates Firms can get those with higher elasticities of demand to purchase the good who would not normally buy it Table 11.1 shows how elasticities of demand vary for coupon/rebate users and non-users

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Price Elasticities of Demand:  Users vs. Nonusers of Coupons
Описание слайда:
Price Elasticities of Demand: Users vs. Nonusers of Coupons

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Airline Fares
Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a higher fare than others
Business travelers have few choices and their demand is less elastic
Casual travelers and families are more price-sensitive and will therefore be choosier
Описание слайда:
Airline Fares Differences in elasticities imply that some customers will pay a higher fare than others Business travelers have few choices and their demand is less elastic Casual travelers and families are more price-sensitive and will therefore be choosier

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Elasticities of Demand for 
Air Travel
Описание слайда:
Elasticities of Demand for Air Travel

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Airline Fares
There are multiple fares for every route flown by airlines
They separate the market by setting various restrictions on the tickets
Must stay over a Saturday night
21-day advance, 14-day advance
Basic restrictions – can change ticket to only certain days
Most expensive: no restrictions – first class
Описание слайда:
Airline Fares There are multiple fares for every route flown by airlines They separate the market by setting various restrictions on the tickets Must stay over a Saturday night 21-day advance, 14-day advance Basic restrictions – can change ticket to only certain days Most expensive: no restrictions – first class

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Other Types of Price Discrimination
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Practice of separating consumers with different demand functions into different groups by charging different prices at different points in time
Initial release of a product, the demand is inelastic
Hard back vs. paperback book
New release movie
Technology
Описание слайда:
Other Types of Price Discrimination Intertemporal Price Discrimination Practice of separating consumers with different demand functions into different groups by charging different prices at different points in time Initial release of a product, the demand is inelastic Hard back vs. paperback book New release movie Technology

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms lower the price to appeal to a general market with a more elastic demand
This can be seen graphically looking at two different groups of consumers – one willing to buy right now and one willing to wait
Описание слайда:
Intertemporal Price Discrimination Once this market has yielded a maximum profit, firms lower the price to appeal to a general market with a more elastic demand This can be seen graphically looking at two different groups of consumers – one willing to buy right now and one willing to wait

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Intertemporal Price Discrimination
Описание слайда:
Intertemporal Price Discrimination

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Other Types of Price Discrimination
Peak-Load Pricing
Practice of charging higher prices during peak periods when capacity constraints cause marginal costs to be higher
Demand for some products may peak at particular times
Rush hour traffic
Electricity - late summer afternoons
Ski resorts on weekends
Описание слайда:
Other Types of Price Discrimination Peak-Load Pricing Practice of charging higher prices during peak periods when capacity constraints cause marginal costs to be higher Demand for some products may peak at particular times Rush hour traffic Electricity - late summer afternoons Ski resorts on weekends

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Peak-Load Pricing
Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to marginal cost
Increased MR and MC would indicate a higher price
Total surplus is higher because charging close to MC
Can measure efficiency gain from peak-load pricing
Описание слайда:
Peak-Load Pricing Objective is to increase efficiency by charging customers close to marginal cost Increased MR and MC would indicate a higher price Total surplus is higher because charging close to MC Can measure efficiency gain from peak-load pricing

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Peak-Load Pricing
With third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was equal
MR is not equal for each market because one market does not impact the other market with peak-load pricing
Price and sales in each market are independent
Ex: electricity, movie theaters
Описание слайда:
Peak-Load Pricing With third-degree price discrimination, the MR for all markets was equal MR is not equal for each market because one market does not impact the other market with peak-load pricing Price and sales in each market are independent Ex: electricity, movie theaters

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Peak-Load Pricing
Описание слайда:
Peak-Load Pricing

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
How would you arrive at the price for	the initial release of the hardbound edition of a book?
Hardback and paperback books are ways for the company to price discriminate
How does the company determine what price to sell the hardback and paperback books for?
How does the company determine when to release the paperback?
Описание слайда:
How to Price a Best-Selling Novel How would you arrive at the price for the initial release of the hardbound edition of a book? Hardback and paperback books are ways for the company to price discriminate How does the company determine what price to sell the hardback and paperback books for? How does the company determine when to release the paperback?

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Company must divide consumers into two groups:
Those willing to buy the more expensive hardback
Those willing to wait for the paperback
Have to be strategic about when to release paperback after hardback
Publishers typically wait 12 to 18 months
Описание слайда:
How to Price a Best-Selling Novel Company must divide consumers into two groups: Those willing to buy the more expensive hardback Those willing to wait for the paperback Have to be strategic about when to release paperback after hardback Publishers typically wait 12 to 18 months

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How to Price a Best-Selling Novel
Publishers must use estimates of past books to determine how much to sell a new book for
Hard to determine the demand for a NEW book
New books are typically sold for about the same price, to take this into account
Demand for paperbacks is more elastic so we should expect it to be priced lower
Описание слайда:
How to Price a Best-Selling Novel Publishers must use estimates of past books to determine how much to sell a new book for Hard to determine the demand for a NEW book New books are typically sold for about the same price, to take this into account Demand for paperbacks is more elastic so we should expect it to be priced lower

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Two-Part Tariffs
A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a price p2 for each unit of product purchased.
Thus the cost of buying x units of product is
			p1 + p2x.
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs A two-part tariff is a lump-sum fee, p1, plus a price p2 for each unit of product purchased. Thus the cost of buying x units of product is p1 + p2x.

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Two-Part Tariffs
Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing, or to any of the price-discrimination schemes discussed so far?
If so, how should the monopolist design its two-part tariff?
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs Should a monopolist prefer a two-part tariff to uniform pricing, or to any of the price-discrimination schemes discussed so far? If so, how should the monopolist design its two-part tariff?

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Two-Part Tariffs
 			p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1 can be?
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be?

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Two-Part Tariffs
 			p1 + p2x
Q: What is the largest that p1 can be?
A: p1 is the “market entrance fee” so the largest it can be is the surplus the buyer gains from entering the market.
Set p1 = CS and now ask what  should be p2?
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs p1 + p2x Q: What is the largest that p1 can be? A: p1 is the “market entrance fee” so the largest it can be is the surplus the buyer gains from entering the market. Set p1 = CS and now ask what should be p2?

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs

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Two-Part Tariffs
The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff by setting its per unit price p2 at marginal cost and setting its lump-sum fee p1 equal to Consumers’ Surplus.
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs The monopolist maximizes its profit when using a two-part tariff by setting its per unit price p2 at marginal cost and setting its lump-sum fee p1 equal to Consumers’ Surplus.

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Two-Part Tariffs
A profit-maximizing two-part tariff gives an efficient market outcome in which the monopolist obtains as profit the total of all gains-to-trade.
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariffs A profit-maximizing two-part tariff gives an efficient market outcome in which the monopolist obtains as profit the total of all gains-to-trade.

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The Two-Part Tariff
Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry and usage fee
Ex: amusement park, golf course, telephone service
A fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product
An additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consume
Pay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff Form of pricing in which consumers are charged both an entry and usage fee Ex: amusement park, golf course, telephone service A fee is charged upfront for right to use/buy the product An additional fee is charged for each unit the consumer wishes to consume Pay a fee to play golf and then pay another fee for each game you play

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The Two-Part Tariff
Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P)
Choosing the trade-off between free-entry and high-use prices or high-entry and zero-use prices
Single Consumer
Assume firm knows consumer demand
Firm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff Pricing decision is setting the entry fee (T) and the usage fee (P) Choosing the trade-off between free-entry and high-use prices or high-entry and zero-use prices Single Consumer Assume firm knows consumer demand Firm wants to capture as much consumer surplus as possible

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Two-Part Tariff with a Single Consumer
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariff with a Single Consumer

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Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Two consumers, but firm can only set one entry fee and one usage fee
Does it make sense to set usage fee equal to MC and entrance fee equal to CS of the consumer with the smaller demand?
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers Two consumers, but firm can only set one entry fee and one usage fee Does it make sense to set usage fee equal to MC and entrance fee equal to CS of the consumer with the smaller demand?

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Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers

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Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers
Firm should set usage fee above MC
Set entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demand
Firm needs to know demand curves
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariff with Two Consumers Firm should set usage fee above MC Set entry fee equal to remaining consumer surplus of consumer with smaller demand Firm needs to know demand curves

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The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers
No exact way to determine P* and T*
Must consider the trade-off between the entry fee T* and the use fee P*
Low entry fee: more entrants and more profit from sales of item
As entry fee becomes smaller, number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will fall
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers No exact way to determine P* and T* Must consider the trade-off between the entry fee T* and the use fee P* Low entry fee: more entrants and more profit from sales of item As entry fee becomes smaller, number of entrants is larger and profit from entry fee will fall

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The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers
To find optimum combination, choose several combinations of P and T
Find combination that maximizes profit
Firm’s profit is divided into two components
Each is a function of entry fee, T assuming a fixed sales price, P
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff with Many Consumers To find optimum combination, choose several combinations of P and T Find combination that maximizes profit Firm’s profit is divided into two components Each is a function of entry fee, T assuming a fixed sales price, P

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Two-Part Tariff with Many Different Consumers
Описание слайда:
Two-Part Tariff with Many Different Consumers

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The Two-Part Tariff
Rule of Thumb
Similar demand: Choose P close to MC and high T
Dissimilar demand: Choose high P and low T
Ex: Disneyland in California and Disney world in Florida have a strategy of high entry fee and charge nothing for ride
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff Rule of Thumb Similar demand: Choose P close to MC and high T Dissimilar demand: Choose high P and low T Ex: Disneyland in California and Disney world in Florida have a strategy of high entry fee and charge nothing for ride

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The Two-Part Tariff With a Twist
Entry price (T) entitles the buyer to a certain number of free units
Gillette razors sold with several blades
Amusement park admission comes with some tokens
On-line fees with free time
Can set higher entry fee without losing many consumers
Higher entry fee captures either surplus without driving them out of the market
Captures more surplus of large customers
Описание слайда:
The Two-Part Tariff With a Twist Entry price (T) entitles the buyer to a certain number of free units Gillette razors sold with several blades Amusement park admission comes with some tokens On-line fees with free time Can set higher entry fee without losing many consumers Higher entry fee captures either surplus without driving them out of the market Captures more surplus of large customers

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Polaroid Cameras
In 1971, Polaroid introduced the SX-70 camera
Polaroid was able to use two-part tariff for pricing of camera/film
Allowed them greater profits than would have been possible if camera used ordinary film
Polaroid had a monopoly on cameras and film
Описание слайда:
Polaroid Cameras In 1971, Polaroid introduced the SX-70 camera Polaroid was able to use two-part tariff for pricing of camera/film Allowed them greater profits than would have been possible if camera used ordinary film Polaroid had a monopoly on cameras and film

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Polaroid Cameras
Buying camera is like entry fee
Unlike an amusement park, for example, the marginal cost of providing an additional camera is significantly greater than zero
It was necessary for Polaroid to have monopoly  
If ordinary film could be used, the price of film would be close to MC
Polaroid needed to gain most of its profits from sale of film
Описание слайда:
Polaroid Cameras Buying camera is like entry fee Unlike an amusement park, for example, the marginal cost of providing an additional camera is significantly greater than zero It was necessary for Polaroid to have monopoly If ordinary film could be used, the price of film would be close to MC Polaroid needed to gain most of its profits from sale of film

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Polaroid Cameras
Analytical framework:
Описание слайда:
Polaroid Cameras Analytical framework:

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Polaroid Cameras
In the end, the film prices were significantly above marginal cost
There was considerable heterogeneity of consumer demands
Описание слайда:
Polaroid Cameras In the end, the film prices were significantly above marginal cost There was considerable heterogeneity of consumer demands

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Bundling
Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantage
Conditions necessary for bundling
Heterogeneous customers
Price discrimination is not possible
Demands must be negatively correlated
Описание слайда:
Bundling Bundling is packaging two or more products to gain a pricing advantage Conditions necessary for bundling Heterogeneous customers Price discrimination is not possible Demands must be negatively correlated

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Bundling
When film company leased “Gone with the Wind,” it required theaters to also lease “Getting Gertie’s Garter”
Why would a company do this?
Company must be able to increase revenue
We can see the reservation prices for each theater and movie
Описание слайда:
Bundling When film company leased “Gone with the Wind,” it required theaters to also lease “Getting Gertie’s Garter” Why would a company do this? Company must be able to increase revenue We can see the reservation prices for each theater and movie

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Bundling
Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie:
Maximum price Wind = $10,000
Maximum price Gertie = $3,000
Total Revenue = $26,000
Описание слайда:
Bundling Renting the movies separately would result in each theater paying the lowest reservation price for each movie: Maximum price Wind = $10,000 Maximum price Gertie = $3,000 Total Revenue = $26,000

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Bundling
If the movies are bundled:
Theater A will pay $15,000 for both
Theater B will pay $14,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000
The movie company will gain more revenue ($2000) by bundling the movie
Описание слайда:
Bundling If the movies are bundled: Theater A will pay $15,000 for both Theater B will pay $14,000 for both If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $28,000 The movie company will gain more revenue ($2000) by bundling the movie

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Relative Valuations
More profitable to bundle because relative valuation of two films are reversed
Demands are negatively correlated
A pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000)
B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000)
Описание слайда:
Relative Valuations More profitable to bundle because relative valuation of two films are reversed Demands are negatively correlated A pays more for Wind ($12,000) than B ($10,000) B pays more for Gertie ($4,000) than A ($3,000)

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Relative Valuations
If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in revenue
Описание слайда:
Relative Valuations If the demands were positively correlated (Theater A would pay more for both films as shown) bundling would not result in an increase in revenue

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Bundling
If the movies are bundled:
Theater A will pay $16,000 for both
Theater B will pay $13,000 for both
If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by selling the films separately
Описание слайда:
Bundling If the movies are bundled: Theater A will pay $16,000 for both Theater B will pay $13,000 for both If each were charged the lower of the two prices, total revenue will be $26,000, the same as by selling the films separately

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Bundling
Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumers
Many consumers with different reservation price combinations for two goods
Can show graphically the preferences of consumers in terms of reservation prices and consumption decisions given prices charged
r1 is reservation price of consumer for good 1
r2 is reservation price of consumer for good 2
Описание слайда:
Bundling Bundling Scenario: Two different goods and many consumers Many consumers with different reservation price combinations for two goods Can show graphically the preferences of consumers in terms of reservation prices and consumption decisions given prices charged r1 is reservation price of consumer for good 1 r2 is reservation price of consumer for good 2

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Reservation Prices
Описание слайда:
Reservation Prices

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Consumption Decisions When
Products are Sold Separately
Описание слайда:
Consumption Decisions When Products are Sold Separately

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Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled
Описание слайда:
Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled

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Consumption Decisions
When Products are Bundled
The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demands
Best when consumers who have high reservation price for Good 1 have a low reservation price for Good 2 and vice versa
Can see graphically looking at positively and negatively correlated prices
Описание слайда:
Consumption Decisions When Products are Bundled The effectiveness of bundling depends upon the degree of negative correlation between the two demands Best when consumers who have high reservation price for Good 1 have a low reservation price for Good 2 and vice versa Can see graphically looking at positively and negatively correlated prices

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Reservation Prices
Описание слайда:
Reservation Prices

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Reservation Prices
Описание слайда:
Reservation Prices

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Movie Example
Описание слайда:
Movie Example

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Mixed Bundling
Practice of selling two or more goods both as a package and individually
This differs from pure bundling when products are sold only as a package
Mixed bundling is good strategy when
Demands are somewhat negatively correlated
Marginal production costs are significant
Описание слайда:
Mixed Bundling Practice of selling two or more goods both as a package and individually This differs from pure bundling when products are sold only as a package Mixed bundling is good strategy when Demands are somewhat negatively correlated Marginal production costs are significant

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Mixed Versus Pure Bundling
Описание слайда:
Mixed Versus Pure Bundling

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Mixed Bundling – Example
Demands are perfectly negatively correlated but significant marginal costs
Four customers under three different strategies
Selling good separately, P1 = $50, P2 = $90
Selling goods only as a bundle, PB = $100
Mixed bundling: 
Sold individually with P1 = P2 = $89.95
Sold as a bundle with PB = $100
Описание слайда:
Mixed Bundling – Example Demands are perfectly negatively correlated but significant marginal costs Four customers under three different strategies Selling good separately, P1 = $50, P2 = $90 Selling goods only as a bundle, PB = $100 Mixed bundling: Sold individually with P1 = P2 = $89.95 Sold as a bundle with PB = $100

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Mixed Bundling – Example
We can see the effects under different scenarios in the following table:
Описание слайда:
Mixed Bundling – Example We can see the effects under different scenarios in the following table:

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Bundling
If MC is zero, mixed bundling can still be more profitable if consumer demands are not perfectly negatively correlated
Example:
Reservation prices for consumers B and C are higher
Compare the same three strategies
Mixed bundling is the more profitable option since everyone will end up buying
Описание слайда:
Bundling If MC is zero, mixed bundling can still be more profitable if consumer demands are not perfectly negatively correlated Example: Reservation prices for consumers B and C are higher Compare the same three strategies Mixed bundling is the more profitable option since everyone will end up buying

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Mixed Bundling with Zero Marginal Costs
Описание слайда:
Mixed Bundling with Zero Marginal Costs

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Bundling in Practice
Car purchasing
Bundles of options such as electric locks with air conditioning
Vacation Travel
Bundling hotel with air fare
Cable television
Premium channels bundled together
Описание слайда:
Bundling in Practice Car purchasing Bundles of options such as electric locks with air conditioning Vacation Travel Bundling hotel with air fare Cable television Premium channels bundled together

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Bundling
Mixed Bundling in Practice
Use of market surveys to determine reservation prices
Design a pricing strategy from the survey results
Can show graphically using information collected from consumers	
Consumers are separated into four regions
Can change prices to find max profits
Описание слайда:
Bundling Mixed Bundling in Practice Use of market surveys to determine reservation prices Design a pricing strategy from the survey results Can show graphically using information collected from consumers Consumers are separated into four regions Can change prices to find max profits

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Mixed Bundling in Practice
Описание слайда:
Mixed Bundling in Practice

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A Restaurant’s Pricing Problem
Описание слайда:
A Restaurant’s Pricing Problem

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Tying
The practice of requiring a customer to purchase one good in order to purchase another
Xerox machines and the paper
IBM mainframe and computer cards
Allows firm to meter demand and practice price discrimination more effectively
Описание слайда:
Tying The practice of requiring a customer to purchase one good in order to purchase another Xerox machines and the paper IBM mainframe and computer cards Allows firm to meter demand and practice price discrimination more effectively

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Tying
Allows the seller to meter the customer and use a two-part tariff to discriminate against the heavy user
McDonald’s
Allows them to protect their brand name
Microsoft
Uses to extend market power
Описание слайда:
Tying Allows the seller to meter the customer and use a two-part tariff to discriminate against the heavy user McDonald’s Allows them to protect their brand name Microsoft Uses to extend market power

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Versioning
Extreme example: damaged goods
 Intel 486
486SX - $333 in 1991
486DX - $588 in 1991
IBM LaserPrinter E (5 pages per minute) LaserPrinter (10 pages per minute)
Описание слайда:
Versioning Extreme example: damaged goods Intel 486 486SX - $333 in 1991 486DX - $588 in 1991 IBM LaserPrinter E (5 pages per minute) LaserPrinter (10 pages per minute)

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Durable-goods pricing
Waiting for the price cut.
Non-price discrimination seems to increase profits
Possible solutions:
 lowest price guarantee
 leasing instead of selling
Описание слайда:
Durable-goods pricing Waiting for the price cut. Non-price discrimination seems to increase profits Possible solutions: lowest price guarantee leasing instead of selling

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Advertising
Firms with market power have to decide how much to advertise
We can show how firms choose profit maximizing advertising
Decision depends on characteristics of demand for firm’s product
Описание слайда:
Advertising Firms with market power have to decide how much to advertise We can show how firms choose profit maximizing advertising Decision depends on characteristics of demand for firm’s product

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Advertising
Assumptions
Firm sets only one price for product
Firm knows quantity demanded depends on price and advertising expenditure dollars, A
Q(P,A)
We can show the firm’s cost curves, revenue curves, and profits under advertising and no advertising
Описание слайда:
Advertising Assumptions Firm sets only one price for product Firm knows quantity demanded depends on price and advertising expenditure dollars, A Q(P,A) We can show the firm’s cost curves, revenue curves, and profits under advertising and no advertising

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ADVERTISING
Описание слайда:
ADVERTISING

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Monopoly Behavior, слайд №124
Описание слайда:

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Monopoly Behavior, слайд №125
Описание слайда:

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Advertising
A Rule of Thumb for Advertising
To maximize profit, the firm’s advertising-to-sales ratio should be equal to minus the ratio of the advertising and price elasticities of demand
Описание слайда:
Advertising A Rule of Thumb for Advertising To maximize profit, the firm’s advertising-to-sales ratio should be equal to minus the ratio of the advertising and price elasticities of demand

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Advertising
An Example
R(Q) = $1 million/yr
$10,000 budget for A (advertising--1% of revenues)
EA = .2 (increase budget $20,000, sales increase by 20%)
EP = -4 (markup price over MC is substantial)
Описание слайда:
Advertising An Example R(Q) = $1 million/yr $10,000 budget for A (advertising--1% of revenues) EA = .2 (increase budget $20,000, sales increase by 20%) EP = -4 (markup price over MC is substantial)

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Advertising
The firm in our example should increase advertising
A/PQ = -(2/-.4) = 5%
Increase budget to $50,000
Описание слайда:
Advertising The firm in our example should increase advertising A/PQ = -(2/-.4) = 5% Increase budget to $50,000

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Advertising – In Practice
Estimate the level of advertising for each of the firms
Supermarkets
EP = -10; EA = 0.1 to 0.3
Convenience stores
EP = -5; EA very small
Designer jeans
EP = -3 to –4; EA = 0.3 to 1
Laundry detergents
EP = -3 to –4; EA very large
Описание слайда:
Advertising – In Practice Estimate the level of advertising for each of the firms Supermarkets EP = -10; EA = 0.1 to 0.3 Convenience stores EP = -5; EA very small Designer jeans EP = -3 to –4; EA = 0.3 to 1 Laundry detergents EP = -3 to –4; EA very large



Теги Monopoly Behavior
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