🗊Презентация The military factor in contemporary international relation

“The military factor in contemporary international relations”

Introduction The term “military relations” refers broadly to the interaction between the armed force of a state as an institution, and the other sectors of the society in which the armed force is embedded. It is an intensely interdisciplinary area of research, reflecting the work of political scientists, military sociologists, and historians. Arguably, the field of military relations really took off – at least in the United States – as social scientists became part of the war effort in World War II. Much of this early military relations research focused on the individual service member and small unit cohesion

The basis of military relations is a dilemma: what Peter Feaver has called the civil–military problematique, which requires a given polity to balance two concerns. On the one hand, it must create a military establishment strong enough to protect the state. On the other, it must somehow ensure that this same military establishment does not turn on the state that established it (Feaver 1996). The basis of military relations is a dilemma: what Peter Feaver has called the civil–military problematique, which requires a given polity to balance two concerns. On the one hand, it must create a military establishment strong enough to protect the state. On the other, it must somehow ensure that this same military establishment does not turn on the state that established it (Feaver 1996).

In response to the critique of the United States in the aftermath of Vietnam, civilian and military analysts revisited the topic of strategy and reexamined the classical theorists and historians such as Clausewitz and Thucydides. Luttwak 2001, Gray 1999, and Collins 2001 place modern military strategy in the post-Vietnam and Cold War contexts. In the post-9/11 world, more attention is paid to what is commonly referred to as the “spectrum of conflict,” including and conventional and unconventional warfare, terrorism, and emerging transnational threats that have become issues of security and military strategy. Buley 2008 and Loo 2008 look at more contemporary issues of military strategy, including the notions of revolutions in military affairs, defense transformation, and current warfare. In response to the critique of the United States in the aftermath of Vietnam, civilian and military analysts revisited the topic of strategy and reexamined the classical theorists and historians such as Clausewitz and Thucydides. Luttwak 2001, Gray 1999, and Collins 2001 place modern military strategy in the post-Vietnam and Cold War contexts. In the post-9/11 world, more attention is paid to what is commonly referred to as the “spectrum of conflict,” including and conventional and unconventional warfare, terrorism, and emerging transnational threats that have become issues of security and military strategy. Buley 2008 and Loo 2008 look at more contemporary issues of military strategy, including the notions of revolutions in military affairs, defense transformation, and current warfare.

There are five sets of questions that lie at the heart of the military bargain at a given time (Owens forthcoming). There are five sets of questions that lie at the heart of the military bargain at a given time (Owens forthcoming).

.Fourth, who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship or something else? How are officers accessed and promoted? Is the accession and promotion of officers based on merit and achievement or political affiliation, social class, ethnicity, or religion? .Fourth, who serves? Is military service an obligation of citizenship or something else? How are officers accessed and promoted? Is the accession and promotion of officers based on merit and achievement or political affiliation, social class, ethnicity, or religion?

In general, there are two lenses through which to examine these questions. The first is the institutional lens, which focuses on how the actors in a polity, including the military as an organization, interact within the institutional framework of a given polity's government. The most influential institutional theory of military relations was advanced fifty years ago by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State (1957). In general, there are two lenses through which to examine these questions. The first is the institutional lens, which focuses on how the actors in a polity, including the military as an organization, interact within the institutional framework of a given polity's government. The most influential institutional theory of military relations was advanced fifty years ago by Samuel Huntington in his seminal work, The Soldier and the State (1957). The second lens is sociological or cultural. This lens focuses on the broad question of military culture vs. liberal society; the role of individuals and groups, e.g. women, minorities, enlisted servicemen and women within the military and the relationships among them; the effectiveness of individual service members in combat; small unit cohesion; the relationship between military service and citizenship (to include the civic republican tradition); the nature of military service (occupation, profession, etc.); and the relationship of militaries and the societies from which they stem. The origins of the sociological perspective on military affairs can be traced to Morris Janowitz’s 1960 book, The Professional Soldier (Burke 1993; 1998).

The political institutions of a state also exert a strong influence on its military relations by allocating relative power to civilian and military leaders. Clearly, different regime types will exhibit different patterns of military relations. The military may be dominant, subordinate to civilian control, or share power (Brooks 2008:33–4). Even in highly militarized regimes, the military may only be one constituent part. For example, in the Soviet Union, the military had to compete against the Communist Party apparatus and the state security system, the KGB, for influence (Nichols 1993). The People's Liberation Army (PLA) faces similar challenges in China. The political institutions of a state also exert a strong influence on its military relations by allocating relative power to civilian and military leaders. Clearly, different regime types will exhibit different patterns of military relations. The military may be dominant, subordinate to civilian control, or share power (Brooks 2008:33–4). Even in highly militarized regimes, the military may only be one constituent part. For example, in the Soviet Union, the military had to compete against the Communist Party apparatus and the state security system, the KGB, for influence (Nichols 1993). The People's Liberation Army (PLA) faces similar challenges in China.

Risa Brooks argues that patterns of military relations affect national security because of their impact on strategic assessment. Brooks identifies two variables that determine the pattern of civil–military relations: (1) the intensity of preference divergence between political and military leaders with regard to corporate, professional, and security issues; and (2) the balance of power between political and military leaders (political dominance, shared power, military dominance). These two variables interact, generating “logics” that affect the institutional features of strategic assessment (Brooks 2008:2–34). Risa Brooks argues that patterns of military relations affect national security because of their impact on strategic assessment. Brooks identifies two variables that determine the pattern of civil–military relations: (1) the intensity of preference divergence between political and military leaders with regard to corporate, professional, and security issues; and (2) the balance of power between political and military leaders (political dominance, shared power, military dominance). These two variables interact, generating “logics” that affect the institutional features of strategic assessment (Brooks 2008:2–34).

Next she identifies four sets of institutional processes that constitute the element of strategic assessment.. Next she identifies four sets of institutional processes that constitute the element of strategic assessment..

In many respects, the current state of theorizing about civil–military relations brings to mind the story of the three blind men examining an elephant.. In many respects, the current state of theorizing about civil–military relations brings to mind the story of the three blind men examining an elephant..

Since each can only sense what he is touching (the trunk, a leg, and the tail) and has no concept of the elephant as a whole, each concludes that the beast is something different from what it really is. Despite the lack of an overarching framework for analyzing civil–military relations, the various areas of the field offer many rich “pastures” in which researchers may graze Since each can only sense what he is touching (the trunk, a leg, and the tail) and has no concept of the elephant as a whole, each concludes that the beast is something different from what it really is. Despite the lack of an overarching framework for analyzing civil–military relations, the various areas of the field offer many rich “pastures” in which researchers may graze

Conclusion .There is no more important question facing a state than the place of its military relative to civil society and the roles that the military exercises. The coercive power that a military institution possesses always makes it, at least theoretically, a threat to the regime. Clearly, there are many possible patterns of military relations that provide different answers to the five questions posed at the beginning of this essay. As the survey of contending theories of military relations suggests, there is no “general” or “unified field” theory that successfully explains all of these patterns (Bland 1999). Nor, given the variety and complexity of civil–military patterns is one likely or desirable.

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